source: selinux/build/scripts.te @ 112

# Joe Presbrey
# presbrey@mit.edu
# 2006/1/15

policy_module(scripts,1.0.0)

### USER ###

require {
        type user_t;
};

afs_access(user_t);
zephyr_access(user_t);

# permit aklog:
kernel_write_proc_files(user_t)
#allow user_t proc_t:file write;

### AFS ###

require {
        type kernel_t;
};

afs_access(kernel_t);
zephyr_access(kernel_t);

### INIT ###

require {
        type initrc_t, tmp_t;
};

# init.d script sets up cell files:
afs_access(initrc_t);
allow initrc_t afsd_etc_t:file { rw_file_perms setattr };

# init.d makes the sessions directory:
allow initrc_t tmp_t:dir { create setattr };

# AFS fs
kernel_write_proc_files(initrc_t)

### CRON ###

require {
        type crond_t, user_cron_spool_t, user_crontab_t;
        type system_crond_t;
        type var_log_t;
};

afs_access(crond_t);
afs_access(user_crontab_t);
### crond can switch to user_t rather than user_crond_t
### (we have pam_env set SELINUX_ROLE_TYPE to accomplish this)
domain_cron_exemption_target(user_t)
domain_entry_file(user_t, user_cron_spool_t)
domain_trans(crond_t, user_cron_spool_t, user_t)
allow user_t crond_t:process sigchld;
allow crond_t self:process setrlimit;
allow crond_t user_t:fd use;
allow user_t crond_t:fd use;
allow user_t crond_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow crond_t user_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow system_crond_t var_log_t:file rw_file_perms;

### SSH ###

require {
        type sshd_t, sshd_tmp_t;
};

afs_access(sshd_t);
### sshd GSSAPI authentication
kerberos_read_keytab(sshd_t)
# forwarded kerberos tickets via ssh -K
allow user_t sshd_tmp_t:file r_file_perms;

dontaudit user_t kernel_t:key all_key_perms;

# (for admof)
# perl
corecmd_exec_bin(sshd_t)
# aklog
corecmd_exec_sbin(sshd_t)
# exec
corecmd_exec_shell(sshd_t)
# fs
kernel_write_proc_files(sshd_t)

### MAIL ###

require {
        type postfix_local_t, procmail_t, sendmail_t;
};

afs_access(postfix_local_t);
afs_access(procmail_t);
mta_sendmail_exec(user_t)
mta_sendmail_exec(system_crond_t)
can_exec(user_t, sendmail_exec_t)
can_exec(system_crond_t, sendmail_exec_t)
allow sendmail_t postfix_local_t:fd use;
allow sendmail_t postfix_local_t:fifo_file { getattr write };
corecmd_exec_bin(procmail_t)
corecmd_exec_sbin(procmail_t)

### HTTPD ###

require {
        type httpd_t, httpd_suexec_exec_t, httpd_suexec_t;
        role user_r;
};

afs_access(httpd_t);
dontaudit httpd_t self:key all_key_perms;
dontaudit httpd_t sshd_t:key all_key_perms;
dontaudit httpd_t kernel_t:key all_key_perms;
allow httpd_t self:process setrlimit;

# SUEXEC PHASE 1
can_exec(httpd_t, httpd_suexec_exec_t)
domain_auto_trans(httpd_t, httpd_suexec_exec_t, httpd_suexec_t)
apache_read_config(httpd_suexec_t)
apache_read_log(httpd_suexec_t)
apache_append_log(httpd_suexec_t)

# SUEXEC PHASE 2
allow httpd_suexec_t self:process { setexec };
allow httpd_suexec_t user_t:process { transition siginh rlimitinh noatsecure };

# SUEXEC PHASE 3
allow { httpd_suexec_t user_t } httpd_t:fd { use };
allow { httpd_suexec_t user_t } httpd_t:fifo_file { read write };
allow { httpd_suexec_t user_t } httpd_t:process { sigchld };
allow { user_t } httpd_suexec_t:fd { use };
#allow httpd_suexec_t user_t:process transition;
domain_unconfined(httpd_suexec_t)

### *** ###

require {
        type var_run_t;
};

# named.pid
allow initrc_t var_run_t:lnk_file create;

# semodule -i
require { type semanage_t, sysadm_home_t; };
allow semanage_t sysadm_home_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow semanage_t sysadm_home_t:file rw_file_perms;

require { type restorecond_t, crond_t; };
dontaudit restorecond_t kernel_t:key all_key_perms;
dontaudit crond_t sshd_t:key all_key_perms;